*IMMANUEL KANT’S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON*, TRANSL. NORMAN KEMP SMITH, LONDON: MACMILLAN, SECOND ED. 1933, 504-505.

*‘Being’* is not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something that could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgement. The proposition, ‘God is omnipotent’, contains two concepts, each of which has its object – God and omnipotence. The small word ‘is’ adds no new predicate, but only serves to posit the predicate in its relation to the subject.

if we say 'there is a God' .....we attach no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit as being an *object* that stands in relation to my *concept*. [...] Otherwise stated, the real contains no more than the merely possible. A hundred real thalers do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers.